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Though evidently sharing many features of the
common Third World experience, Ethiopia is
distinguished from virtually all other African states
(though not from a number of Asian ones) by a pattern
of state formation and a consequent dynamic of
potential change which are overwhelmingly indigenous
rather colonial in origin. It is further distinguished
from most (though again not all) Third World states
by its commitment since the 1974 revolution to a
Marxist-Leninist political trajectory, which especially
since the creation of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia
(WPE) in 1984, has led to the creation of formal
political institutions consciously derived from Soviet
models. One obvious concern in discussing Ethiopia
must therefore be for the relevance and applicability of
such models to the current circumstances of the Third
World. This is an exercise from which some useful
conclusions can be drawn. Yet generalisation must be
approached with caution. Ethiopian socialism (no less
than Soviet, Chinese or Cuban socialisms) is marked
by distinctive features which must be ascribed to its
local setting. With that in mind, I shall look first at the
bases of Ethiopian statehood, then at the process of
revolutionary transformation which has led to the
creation of the present institutional structure, and
finally at the problems faced by this structure in
responding to the all too evident crisis of the Ethiopian
state and economy.
Origins of State and Revolution
Ethiopia is virtually unique in Africa in possessing a
tradition of the state which long predates the colonial
era. While most African societies (including, of
course, several peoples subsequently incorporated
into Ethiopia) were governed through political
systems based on a mythology of descent from a
common ancestor (and describable, despite the
enormous variety of political arrangements to which
this gave rise, as 'tribal'), Ethiopia has long been
governed through a hierarchical political structure
based ultimately on the control of territory. For many
centuries this hierarchy was headed by an emperor
whose membership of a specific 'Solomonic' dynasty
was regarded as of critical importance. But the
survival of the state after the dynasty's collapse, and
most significantly its revival and expansion from the
reign of Tewodros (1855-68) onwards, demonstrate
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that this state was no mere dynastic creation, but was,
rather, deeply rooted in the social and economic
structures of the people who comprised it. Uniquely in
sub-Saharan Africa, moreover, it was a literate
society, with its own written language through which
the historical tradition of statehood could be
transmitted.
Nor, still more remarkably, was it an ethnic state. The
key role of Amhara culture in the Ethiopian political
system, including the use of Amharic as the language
of government and the special status (until the
revolution) of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, has
led many observers to view Ethiopia as a state created
and maintained by the simple imposition of 'Amhara
domination' over subordinate (or internally colonised)
peoples. It is a picture that resistance movements
directed against the central government have been
understandably eager to emphasise. But it is true only
in a limited sense. Ethiopia has (like the United States)
a dominant culture, to which anyone ambitious for a
place in the state apparatus, and especially for
national political power, must to some degree
assimilate. This culture likewise reflects the historically
pre-eminent position of a particular group, which
gains considerable advantages not just from its
familiarity with the language of government, but from
personal contacts, cultural identities and other
affinities with the political system. But the system is
not ethnically exclusive. It has invariably included
non-Amharic speakers, the most significant of whom
in historical terms, the Tigrinya speakers of the
northern plateau, can claim to be the founders of the
state itself; and positions of the highest political power
have been open to individuals of any group who have
been prepared to associate themselves with the central
government.'
This ethnic non-exclusiveness has been essential to the
survival of the Ethiopian state, particularly as it has
expanded to incorporate new peoples since the later
nineteenth century, and as the centres of political and
economic power have shifted steadily southwards.
The price it has paid - and it has been a very heavy
one - has been the progressive marginalisation of
peoples, especially in Eritrea and Tigray, who would
once have viewed themselves as part of the historically
dominant core. This has proved much more of a
problem for the revolutionary regime than the
management of other peoples - Oromo, Sidama,
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Wollamo, Kaffa, even Afar and Somali - who were
incorporated into the Ethiopian state a century or less
ago.
This Ethiopian state has shared the interests of states
everywhere. As a hierarchy of control, manned by
officials who maintain themselves by extracting a
surplus from the directly productive areas of the
economy, it has an interest in retaining (and if possible
expanding) its territory; in extending its degree of
effective control over the people within its frontiers;
and in maintaining the external political and economic
linkages which are essential both to surplus extraction
(which in Ethiopia, as in other parts of Africa, depends
to a large extent on state control of external trade), and
to importing the manufactured goods (notably
armaments) which are needed for central control and
elite satisfaction. The modernising emperors who
ruled Ethiopia from 1855 to 1974, nonetheless, could
not fully achieve their state-creating goals, any more
than French kings or Russian czars could achieve
theirs, because of the inherent limitations placed on
them by the nature of the political structures through
which they had to rule. The imperial regime failed
because it could establish neither the political nor the
economic and military/administrative conditions
required for state transformation.
The most important failure was political. John
Markakis has correctly identified the exclusion from
the state of new professional elites geared to
government as the key to the formation of separatist
movements throughout the Horn of Africa, including
notably those in Eritrea, Ogaden and Southern
Sudan;2 but the same applies to those who launched
the 1974 revolution in Addis Ababa itself. Though the
imperial regime provided employment for well-
educated young men (the leading positions, even so,
being largely reserved for those who had connections
with the court), it had no mechanism for meeting their
political aspirations, of the kind that was furnished by
the anti-colonial nationalist movements in other parts
Much of this contribution draws on my book, Transformation and
Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge, 1988) and sources
noted in the book are not footnoted here. This text was revised for
publication in December 1989.
'¡f this seems disputable, it maybe helpful to consider when last an
ethnic Amhara held the supreme position in the Ethiopian state.
Mengistu Haile-Mariam, though his origins are uncertain, is
generally regarded as of Wollamo parentage (at least on his father's
side), from northern Sidamo or southern Shoa. He was preceded by
an Oromo, Teferi Benti (1974-77), who in turn took over from an
Eritrean, Aman Andom (1974). Nor could even Haile-Selassie
(1930-74) be regarded as unequivocally Amhara: he was more
Oromo than anything else, with elements of Amhara and Gurage.
Zawditu (1916-30) and Menilek (1889-1913) had probably the best
claims to Amhara ethnicity, though again with Oromo elements,
while ¡yasu (1913-16) identified himself strongly with his father's
Wollo Oromo people. Yohannes (1872-89) was Tigrayan. It is
scarcely possible to find an unequivocally Amhara ruler of Ethiopia
in the last 120 years.
2 See J. Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa
(Cambridge, 1987).
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of Africa. The absence of political parties likewise
deprived the regime of any effective mechanism
through which it could link the government in Addis
Ababa to the vast mass of the population, especially in
the countryside. This failure was most obvious in
Eritrea, but only because Eritrea already had a party
structure of a kind that did not exist anywhere else in
Ethiopia, having been politically mobilised first by
Italian colonialism, and then by the conflicts over the
political future of the territory after the Second World
War. But exactly the same gap existed throughout the
country, and was shown up by incidents such as the
Wako rebellion in B ale,3 or the revolt over agricultural
income tax in Gojjam.4 The absence of political links,
and the restriction of government to a small coterie
closely centred on the court in Addis Ababa, in turn
reduced the state's effectiveness as a developmental or
distributive agency - a failure most sharply
illustrated by its incapacity to react to the 1973-74
famine in Wollo.
These combined failures provide the classic conditions
for revolution, especially in decaying agrarian
monarchies faced by the challenge of modern state
formation; and Ethiopia found itself in this respect, as
in many others, in the mainstream of revolutionary
political change. There are, however, two very
different ways in which such change can be brought
about.5 On the one hand, it may be possible for the old
regime, undermined by its loss of political legitimacy
and effectiveness, to be overthrown by an uprising in
the national capital, and displaced by a government of
the revolutionary intelligentsia, which then puts
through the measures such as land reform which are
needed to extend the new system to the countryside.
This is the experience of France and Russia, and in a
variant form of Iran. On the other hand, if the existing
regime is capable of retaining control over the centre,
the revolutionary elite may start by organising the
peasantry and through guerrilla warfare, establish the
control over the countryside from which they can
surround and capture the capital; this is, of course, the
experience of China, echoed in Vietnam, Kampuchea,
Cuba and Nicaragua. The major tragedy of
revolutionary Ethiopia has been that it has experienced
both simultaneously.
Accordingly, I would regard both the present
Ethiopian government, which gained power through
the first of these mechanisms, and insurgent
movements such as the EPLF and TPLF which are
seeking to gain power through the second, as different
and opposed elements of the same revolution. This is a
viewpoint which would be strongly contested by both
'Ibid.. pp.198 & seq.
2See P. Schwab, Decision-making in Ethiopia (London, 1972)
pp.158-69; J. Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity
(Oxford, 1974) pp.376-87.
See S. P. Hutchington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New
Haven, 1968) ch.5.
sides, each of which seeks to present itself as the sole
authentic representative of revolutionary change. But
not only do both the Ethiopian government and its
opponents spring from the same initial conditions;
they likewise share the same ideology, the same basic
goals, and many ofthe same policies and organisational
techniques. The key goal, in each case, is the creation
of a hierarchical, efficient and centrally directed state
- a Jacobin or Leninist ideal, in which popular
participation is welcomed only in so far as it can be
harnessed to organised central power.
The Leninist Model
Ethiopia has since 1974, and especially since the
creation of the WPE in 1984, made the most sustained
attempt by any Africarn state to create a Marxist-
Leninist structure of government along broadly Soviet
lines. This enterprise has often been criticised, from
the left no less (in fact, generally more) than from the
right, as the brutal imposition of an autocratic military
dictatorship, using a largely meretricious Marxist
rhetoric - a charge summed up in John Markakis'
widely cited phrase, 'garrison socialism'.6 Much of this
criticism is justified. The Ethiopian regime does
indeed have a substantial military element in its top
leadership, and has readily resorted to force as a
response to the chronic economic and political
problems which it has faced - and which its own
rigidly centralist attitude has often exacerbated. But it
is not enough to use this as a pretext for dismissing the
Ethiopian experience as a serious attempt to apply
'socialist' solutions to the peculiarly intractable
problems facing African states. It may be more
helpful, indeed, to regard socialism (in its Leninist
form) as a doctrine specially apposite to state
consolidation in the Third World, which may be
expected to appeal to elites whose primary goal is the
creation of a centralised and disciplined structure of
political control. This is of course a goal which the
military, as the most hierarchically organised section
of the state bureaucracy, may be expected to share.
The problems of revolutionary state consolidation in
Ethiopia, along with many of its achievements, must
be ascribed at least in part to the Leninist model itself.
That military rulers do not more often use Leninism as
a tool for state formation may be due, not so much to
the unacceptability of the goal, as to the difficulty of
reconciling this means of achieving it with the
military's existing interests and alliances. Military
regimes which depend on Western (and especially
American) support readily regard 'communism' as the
arch-enemy. They may be engaged in warfare against
guerrilla opposition movements which draw their
inspiration from Marx, and look to anti-communism
as an ideological prop to their own nationalist
6 See J. Markakis, National and C/ass Conflict . . . chs. 8-9.
mission. The officer corps often have strong links with
social classes whose interests are the first to be
threatened by a Leninist ideology which seeks to
centralise economic power in the hands of the state.
And a Leninist party structure undermines the
institutional autonomy of the military itself, which
must be subordinated to the control of the party
apparatus in a way which undercuts the military
command.
All of these obstacles stood in the way of a Leninist
military regime in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian military's
longstanding dependence on the United States was
reinforced, at the time the revolution broke out in
1974, by heavy Soviet support for Ethiopia's main
regional rival, the Somali Republic. The insurgency in
Eritrea, supported by radical Arab states with Cuban
assistance and the indirect backing of the Soviet
Union, was articulating an increasingly Marxist
rationale for its struggle for separate independence.
The army, whose members had been regularly
rewarded over the previous century with grants of land
in the conquered territories of the south and west, had
an evident interest in maintaining the highly
exploitative relations of production which this system
of land tenure created.
In the hands of the revolutionary regime, Leninism
nonetheless provided a means to consolidate and
extend the power of the state, while divorcing it from
the bankrupt formula of absolute monarchy which
had previously been used to sustain it. Though the
outcome of the revolution was at one level the result of
bloody power struggles between contending groups
and individuals, it also represented, at the level of
consciousness, an effective synthesis between a
historical tradition of the state which was most
strongly entrenched in the military, and a means to
implement a conception of centralised state power
which could be viewed through the prism of Marxism-
Leninism as rational, progressive and above all
scientific. The extraordinary determination with
which the Ethiopian military regime and its Marxist
civilian allies sought to create an institutional
structure based on broadly Soviet models was thus
derived, not merely from an immediate need for Soviet
military aid, but from a 'longue duree' of political
evolution which Ethiopia shared with no other state in
Africa. To this end, the military reversed its
superpower alliance (exposing itself in the process to
the Somali invasion of 1977-78), took over the
ideology associated with its secessionist enemies,
pushed through a series of far-reaching reforms which
destroyed the economic base of the aristocratic and
landholding classes, and created a Leninist vanguard
party which is rather more than a mere front for the
maintenance of military dictatorship. Though the
regime's overriding goal is, as under Haile-Selassie,
the maintenance and extension of a centralised
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Ethiopian state, the revolutionary transformation of
the means to achieve this goal deserves rather greater
recognition than it has usually received.
This transformation consisted in three interlocking
elements, through which the new regime sought to
create the intermediary institutions between central
political power and the social and economic base
which had been so evidently inadequate under its
predecessor: firstly, the establishment of a new
structure of institutional control; secondly, the drastic
reorganisation of the economic basis of state power;
and thirdly, a selective widening of political
representation. All of these ends were systematically
and (for the most part) sincerely pursued, and
contributed to the vast extension of state power and
effectiveness which had taken place since the
revolution. All likewise contained flaws which help to
explain the current crisis of the Ethiopian state.
Institutional Transformation
The revolutionary regime could, as already noted,
draw on the powerful tradition of statehood which
had enabled the central Ethiopian highlands to sustain
a recognisable political structure over a period of some
two thousand years, and preserve Ethiopia's
independence through the colonial scramble for the
continent. The revolution resulted in the trans-
formation of a previously largely personal set of
relationships, within a characteristically feudal
structure of deference and subordination, into
institutional relationships of much greater complexity
and effectiveness. But the new regime did not have to
cope with the problem of creating either the state itself,
or the attitudes to authority which sustained it.
The key base-level institutions of revolutionary
Ethiopia are the peasants' associations and the urban
dwellers' associations (or kebelles), which were both
established as agencies of local self-administration,
replacing mechanisms for rural and urban control
which had been destroyed by the great revolutionary
reforms of 1975. The rural land reform, which
abolished all private land ownership and the private
hire of agricultural labour, could only be implemented
through an organisation which allocated land within a
given area (notionally of 800 hectares, but in practice
very variable) among the peasant families which
farmed it. The urban land reform, which abolished
privately rented housing, likewise required an
organisation to allocate housing and collect rents on a
communal basis.
These two institutions have now become so firmly
established that their disappearance is inconceivable,
regardless of what further upheavals Ethiopia may yet
have to suffer. They were given from the start a wide
range of administrative functions in addition to the
basic ones for which they were established, and these
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have steadily been added to, as each new government
programme calls on them for its local level
implementation. Every urban house is numbered and
registered. The kebelle provides (and can, as a
punishment, take away) the ration cards which
families in major towns need to buy their allocation of
subsidised food. It has its own administrative
headquarters, its judicial tribunal, its shop, and its
women's and youth organisations. It provides the
structure through which to run aid projects and
literacy campaigns, to get out the crowd for obligatory
demonstrations, and to enforce military conscription.
Its armed guards police the streets at night, enforce the
curfew and help to make Ethiopian cities remarkably
free from violent crime.
The peasants' association provides a similar range of
services, with additional responsibilities imposed by
the requirements of control over the rural economy.
Its most important function is to allocate the basic
economic resource, land, among its member families.
It may also select families in eroded highland areas for
resettlement in the south and west, and serves as the
basic unit for the villagisation programme, under
which scattered homesteads are being concentrated in
villages laid out on a uniform grid - a process which
brings peasants much more directly under the control
of their associations. And while kebelles supervise the
distribution of food to their inhabitants, peasants'
associations have the much less popular task of
extracting quotas of grain from farmers at government
controlled prices.
While pre-revolutionary landlords and local governors
had a position which depended to a large extent on
their personal status, the role of kebelle and peasants'
association chairmen is more directly created by state
power. They are therefore more easily displaced, and
more amenable to incorporation into an administrative
hierarchy. Initially, they had a good deal of autonomy,
but since the end of the terror in 1978 they have
become government agents under an electoral veneer.
Kebelles are grouped into 'highers' (or kefienyas), and
in the largest cities, zones. Peasants' associations come
under the regional administrative hierarchy. These
hierarchies are in turn being progressively permeated
by party (rather than state) officials. A similar process
of centralisation and party penetration has taken place
in other mass organisations such as the trade unions,
and the women's and youth associations. Participation
by women in leadership positions is almost entirely
restricted to the women's associations, and to posts in
the party structure concerned with women's affairs.
The second major institutional structure is the party,
established under the guise of the Commission for
Organising the Party of the Working People of
Ethiopia (COPWE) from late 1979, and formally
launched as the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in
September 1984. A vanguard party constructed on
strictly Leninist lines, this is straightforwardly
directed from the top. Ritual references to the 'broad
masses' barely disguise a political structure which is
run by and in the interests of classes dependent on
state employment. Government figures attest the
small proportion of party members and party leaders
who are either peasants or workers. But although
emphatically a party of the state apparatus, it is not
simply a party of the military. The Political Bureau
includes several influential survivors of the group of
civilian Marxist intellectuals who were prominent in
the early years of the revolution, and as one moves
down the party hierarchy, the proportion of military
appointees steadily diminishes. For example, of the 30
regional party first secretaries announced late in 1988,
18 are former soldiers, while the great majority of the
hundred or so provincial first secretaries are civilians.
Most of these are former petty functionaries of the
kind who take local level leadership positions in
political parties throughout the continent, including
schoolteachers, other technical agents of state
administration such as health and agricultural
employees, and some officials who have crossed the
dividing line from the ordinary bureaucracy. Most of
them found their way into active politics (some at a
very early age) during the upheavals of the mid-i 970s.
Party officials take the lead at every level in local
administration. Political power in rural Africa is
nothing if not visible: Who has the biggest office? Who
gives the orders? Who demonstrates deference to
whom? In Ethiopia, all of these signs point to the
supremacy of the party, even when the provincial first
secretary is a former teacher, and the provincial
administrator (his counterpart in the state admini-
stration) is an ex-army officer. And though the real
commitment of party officials to Marxist-Leninist
dogma is something that they may well keep to
themselves, they certainly have gone through an
extensive programme of ideological and organisational
training, either in the USSR and Eastern Europe, or in
the ideological schools in Ethiopia itself. The total
membership of the party was about 30,000 late in
1985, rather less than 0.1 per cent of the total national
population, though it has since grown to probably
about 80,000 members. Ordinary party members have
been expected to take a leading role in implementing
government policies such as agricultural resettlement
(when groups of cadres were sent to set up special
party units in resettlement zones), or villagisation and
the establishment of agricultural producers'
cooperatives (or collective farms). Many of those
whom I have seen, especially in outlying rural areas,
perform these tasks with considerable dedication.
Within the military, party officials form a distinct
cadre. The former military men (almost all of whom
were officers) who hold high positions in the WPE
leadership went into politics from 1974 onwards, and
(except for the few who still hold military
appointments) have long since dropped their military
ranks and uniforms. Most of these were members of
the Derg, though some (including several personal
associates of Mengistu Haile-Maryam) have come in
through other channels. Though they hold party
positions, the survivors of the Derg are steadily
declining in importance with each successive govern-
ment reshuffle or organisational change, even when -
like Melaku Teferra, the Derg's most brutal
strongman and former party first secretary in Gonder
- they are not dismissed altogether. Within the armed
forces, distinct career patterns separate officers in
command positions, from those in the party hierarchy
which has developed from the former Military
Political Administration of the Armed Forces.
Though leading military commanders are members of
the Central Committee of the WPE, this is no more
than a titular recognition of their status, and their
commitment to any form of Marxism-Leninism is
sometimes paper-thin. This division between career
officers and party officials within the military
underlay the attempted coup d'etat of May 1989,
which was led by a group of senior military
commanders.
The third leg of the new institutional structure is the
military and the civil bureaucracy, vastly expanded in
the case of the military from some.45,000 before the
revolution to probably about 300,000 from the late
l970s onwards; some estimates of its current strength
go as high as half a million. Despite the SomaTh war of
1977-78, these are, of course, overwhelmingly
committed to the demands of internal control, at
which in the later l980s they have proved decreasingly
effective. With the partial demobilisation of the
peasant levies raised in the late l970s, numbers have
been kept up from the mid-l980s by a regular though
selective process of conscription, which has proved
increasingly difficult to enforce following successive
disasters in the north.
The civilian bureaucracy has also expanded con-
siderably. The only authoritative figures that I have
been able to find show an increase from 109,322 to
167,860 between 1977-78 and 1982-83 in the number of
civilian employees financed from the central govern-
ment budget, an annual growth rate of some 9.5 per
cent. Even though civil service salaries have remained
unchanged (despite a high rate of inflation) since the
revolution, this rate of increase is likely to have slowed
in the later i980s, owing to pressure on tax revenues. It
excludes the large growth of employment in kebelles
and peasants' associations, other mass organisations
and state corporations. And along with the expansion
of state regulatory power, 'breaches of regulations'
(together with misappropriation of public property
and 'crimes against the economy') have overtaken
private offences such as assault and theft as the
commonest category of crime.
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regime, however, both created and required a vastly
greater capacity for surplus extraction, expressed in a
rise in government tax revenues from 779.8 million birr
in 1973-74 to 1996.6 million in 1982-83. Much of this
increase came from the expropriation of the assets of
the former economically dominant classes which after
the revolution accrued to the state. By 1982-83, nearly
20 per cent of total government revenues came from
'profits, interest and rent', or in other words from
nationalised businesses and urban houses. Direct
taxes on trade also rose sharply, and the percentage of
coffee export values retained by the producer dropped
from an average of 62.3 per cent in 1960-74, to only
41.3 per cent in 1978-84. By far the greater part of the
increase in government revenues came immediately
after the revolution, in the form of a once-and-for-all
rise in extractive capacity; thereafter, the rate of
increase tailed off sharply, along with the econmomy
from which the revenues were drawn. Although
central government income from the subsistence
sector remained at much the same low level (about
5 per cent) of total revenues after the revolution as
before, actual exactions from the peasantry were
increased by a variety of local demands and special
levies, and also by the imposition of quotas for grain
which peasants (especially in surplus producing areas)
were required to sell at official prices to government
buying agencies. The efficiency of the government's
extractive apparatus was indicated by its ability to
collect a high proportion of the taxes due even from
badly famine-affected regions.8
All that this amounted to, however, was the
expropriation of an increasing proportion of a
diminishing surplus. The underlying level of per capita
grain production declined steadily during the later
l970s and the 1980s, independently of the considerable
fluctuations due to weather conditions and other local
factors. So did the level of coffee and other export crop
production (with the possible exception of the narcotic
chat, which was exported largely to the Arabian
peninsula), and stringent controls on internal trade
and local consumption were needed to extract enough
coffee from the domestic economy to meet Ethiopia's
export quota under the International Coffee Agree-
ment. Internal customs posts (a feature of Ethiopia's
political economy before 1935) have been reintroduced
to control trade in coffee, grain and contraband
imported goods, and in the process to demonstrate the
level of physical control which the government needs
to police the economy. These revenues were used
overwhelmingly for consumption purposes, and
especially to maintain the military, which by 1988
accounted (on Mengistu Haile-Maryam's admission)
for about half of government expenditure and 15 per
8This point is made in a recent paper, Adhana Haue Adhana,
'Peasant Response to Famine in Ethiopia 1975-1985', International
Conference on Environmental Stress and Security, Stockholm,
December 1988.
The Economic Basis of State Power
This vast expansion in the institutional structure of the
state was built on a productive base of (even for an
African state) quite exceptional fragility. Ethiopia
was, and remains, one of the poorest states in the
world - on current World Bank figures, it is by some
way the poorest.7 It has virtually no commercially
exploitable minerals, and at the time of the revolution,
when all foreign companies were nationalised without
compensation, there were scarcely any companies of
any importance to nationalise; the major American
enterprise, for which compensation was later agreed at
a mere US$5 million, was Kalamazoo Spice, a buying
agency for peasant-grown herbs and spices. The level
of incorporation into the global economy was one of
the lowest in Africa, with some 60 per cent of
published exports coming from a single crop, coffee.
And that this relative economic autonomy held no
evident potential for indigenous economic growth was
most starkly demonstrated by the predominance of a
peasant mode of production barely able to assure its
own subsistence, and vulnerable (as in Wollo and
Tigray in 1973/4) to catastrophic famine.
Since the revolution, the whole of the economy (apart
from some areas of petty trade) has been brought
under state control. Industry is managed through state
corporations, and small-scale and handicraft producers
have been induced (though not formally compelled) to
join together as cooperatives. Though compensation
has been agreed for some of the foreign enterprises
nationalised in 1974-75, the former management has
not returned, and no new foreign businesses have been
established. Trade in the commodities most important
to government, notably grain and coffee, is closely
controlled, and the regime has pursued a policy of
voluntary agricultural collectivisation, aided by tax
and other inducements. Peasants' association chair-
men, for example, can be encouraged to form
collectives, and thus gain both official favour and
greater control over their own members. A formal
structure of command planning was introduced in
September 1984 (with the aid of a team of Soviet
Gosplan advisors), though its implementation has
been impeded both by the impracticability of the plan
itself, and by the need to divert resources to meet crises
such as famine.
Under the imperial regime, the revenue base of the
state was derived largely from a small group of taxes
on urban income and consumption. The subsistence
sector was virtually untaxable, and even taxes on
coffee exports accounted for no more than 6-7 per cent
of total government revenues. The revolutionary
7The World Bank, World Developmenl Report 1989 (Washington,
1989) p.164, gives Ethiopia's GNP per capita in 1987 as $130,
compared with $150 for the next poorest state in the world; there are
also a few states for which figures are not available.
cent of gross domestic product.9 Such funds as
remained for investment were disproportionately
channelled into a small number of highly capitalised
enterprises, with low rates of return, including the
state farms and a few showpiece industrial projects
built with Eastern European assistance.
A further critical aspect of revolutionary surplus
expropriation is its geographical distribution. The
economy that matters is concentrated almost entirely
in the centre, south and west of the country, in areas
that have remained under firm government control.
The major coffee producing regions, notably Kaffa
and Sidamo, are in the south-west. By far the greater
part of surplus grain is grown in the three central
regions of Shoa, Arsi and Gojjam, together with
adjacent areas of northern Bale and Welega. Chat
production is heavily concentrated in highland
Hararge, while such industry as Ethiopia possesses is
almost all in Addis Ababa, or strung out along the
road and rail links south and east of the city. The areas
of major insurgent activity, both in the north (Eritrea,
Tigray, and northern Gonder and Wollo) and in the
Ogaden, produce virtually no marketable surplus, and
are also the regions most chronically short of food.
The most important exception is the farming complex
around Humera on the Sudanese border in north-west
Gonder, where sesame seed cultivation expanded
dynamically in the years immediately before the
revolution. In the 1980s, however, even before
Humera was lost to the government early in 1989, the
state farms in the area, together with those in western
Eritrea, were maintained at a substantial loss for
symbolic purposes. Despite the enormous drain of
resources to fight the wars in the north, the amount of
direct damage that they have done to the sections of
the, economy required for state maintenance has
therefore been surprisingly slight.
The Structure of Representation
The major impetus for revolutionary transformation
comes from a massive expansion of popular
participation in political life. People become involved
in politics to an extent, and in ways, that were
previously inconceivable. This has certainly occurred
in Ethiopia, even though this participation is not free
or democratic in any Western liberal sense of the
words. The elections to institutions such as the
National Shengo (or supreme soviet) establishe.d since
1987 under the constitution of the People's Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) are very little more than
a rubber-stamping of central nominations. Even
within local level institutions such as kebelles and
peasants' associations, the leadership (though drawn
from local residents) is effectively put in place by
Mengistu Haile-Maryam, Speech to the 9th Session of the Central
Committee of the WPE, 7November 1988.
higher state or party officials. But nonetheless, the
'broad masses' (as they are usually termed) have been
brought into politics through measures such as land
reform and the abolition o private rented housing,
through frequent meetings of kebelles, peasants'
associations and other mass organisations, and
through the expansion of education and literacy.
The central political problem for any revolutionary
regime is to combine this increased level of
participation with the requirements of state consoli-
dation. At one level, this has been achieved in Ethiopia
through the institutional structure already outlined.
The draft constitution of the PDRE, for example, was
discussed at meetings of kebelles, peasants' associations
and other mass organisations throughout the country
(and indeed abroad), and a number of amendments
(none of which affected the basic provisions of the
document) were made as a result. The most significant
was the abandonment of a commitment to monogamy,
in deference to Muslim wishes. At another level, that
of formal state ideology, there seems to me to have
been very little attempt to articulate any sophisticated
application of Marxism to a society at Ethiopia's level
of development. The inculcation of Marxism in
schools and mass organisations is simplistic and
mechanical, and constant invocation of the 'broad
masses' substitutes in official rhetoric for any serious
class analysis.
But by far the most critical area is the representation of
ethnic or regional interests, commonly described as
'nationalities'. For the past century (precisely, since
the emperor Menilek's accession in 1889), the political
and geographical centre of Ethiopia has been in Shoa,
a region of mixed Oromo, Amhara and other peoples,
most of whose population is of Oromo origin, even
though much of it is assimilated to Amhara language
and culture. Many Shoans are ethnically unidentifiable.
Given its ethnic heterogeneity, its geographical
centrality, its dominance of the state, and its key
position in the modern externally oriented economy,
this Shoan core has had an evident interest in
articulating a composite Ethiopian nationalism just
as, conversely, the regions to the north have developed
their own peripheral nationalisms, in response to their
increasing economic marginalisation and their distance
from the new centres of political power. This
Ethiopian nationalism has likewise - and equally
understandably, in keeping with their own interests
and mission - become deeply entrenched in central
government institutions, and notably the armed
forces.
The revolutionary leadership sought from the start,
under the slogan Ityopya tikdem or Ethiopia First, to
mobilise this composite nationalism as a source of
popular unity, and to extend its appeal by removing
elements of traditional political identity, such as
adherence to Orthodox Christianity, which prevented
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it from serving as a fully national symbol. This
leadership was itself drawn from a wide variety of
ethnic origins. The first chairman of the Provisional
Military Administrative Council, Aman Andom, was
Eritrean; the second, Teferi Benti, was a Shoan
Oromo; Mengistu Haile-Maryam is generally regarded
as of Wollamo origin, from Sidamo in the south; the
former second-ranking member of the Derg and
Vice-President, Fisseha Desta, is from Tigray; the
third-ranking member and Prime Minister, Fikre-
Selassie Wogderes, is a Shoan of indeterminate
ethnicity from a largely Oromo area. Given this range
of origins, as well as the regime's willingness to
overthrow the previous structure of domination
indicated by land reform, there is no reason to regard
its commitment to an undifferentiated Ethiopian
nationalism as merely the cover for 'Amhara
domination' which it is frequently portrayed as by its
opponents.
This nationalist commitment was allied to a Jacobin
emphasis on centralisation. Apart from a brief period
early in the revolution, when the Derg (under the
influence of its then civilian ally, Meison) appointed
governors of local origin to the major southern
regions, its concern was almost exclusively with
central control. Where, as in much of southern
Ethiopia, the revolution brought evident benefits to
the mass of the population by abolishing the
previously exploitative structure of landholding, this
centralisation was broadly acceptable, and enabled
many areas of the country to be much more effectively
incorporated into a national political structure than
ever before. Where, as in Gonder or Tigray, land
reform had little to offer a peasantry which already
largely controlled its own means of production, and
traditions of local autonomy were well entrenched,
centralisation was catastrophically counterproductive.
Regional representatives of the Derg, reacting
repressively to what they saw as 'narrow nationalism',
regional chauvinism, peasant backwardness or
outright counterrevoluntary activity, succeeded only
in driving large areas of the country into the arms of
the opposition.
It is here worth emphasising the striking discrepancy
between the charges of ethnic domination often
brought against the Ethiopian central government,
and the actual distribution of effective regional
opposition to the regime. The areas of effective
opposition - highland Eritrea, Tigray, northern
Wollo and Gonder - are for the most part Orthodox
Christian regions, inhabited by Tigrinya and even
Amharic speaking peoples, which have been closely
associated with the Ethiopian state since the earliest
times; their people have been readily recruited to
central government institutions (though in appreciably
smaller numbers than the Shoans), and they have
suffered little evident economic exploitation. The
recently conquered regions of the south and west, on
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the other hand, have been culturally far less closely
attuned to the dominant group, have been subject to a
vastly greater level of economic exploitation, and have
been virtually excluded from central government
office; yet attempts by Oromo and other opposition
movements to mobilise ethnic identities against the
central government have achieved nothing remotely
approaching the success of the opposition movements
in the north. It is economic marginalisation, not ethnic
discrimination, that accounts for the 'national
question' in modern Ethiopia.
Despite the high level of regional opposition, there is
no reason to suppose that the regime has abandoned
its centralist priorities. The constitution of the PDRE
introduced in 1987, though it makes provision for
'autonomous regions' in addition to ordinary
administrative regions, at the same time makes clear
that Ethiopia is a unitary state, and both the powers
and the boundaries of the regions can at any time be
changed by the National Shengo in Addis Ababa. The
WPE is likewise a unitary organisation, guided by the
principles of democratic centralism, to which local
party organs are subservient. I am not aWare of any
pronouncement by Mengistu Haile-Maryam, or
anyone else in the top party leadership, indicating that
local autonomy or the identities of individual
nationalities are to be valued in themselves, rather
than forced on the leadership in response to conditions
that it cannot control.
Nonetheless, the central government has been obliged
to make at least some formal concessions to demands
for regional autonomy. From early in the revolution,
the regime started broadcasting in other languages
than Amharic; and from 1979 the national literacy
campaign was conducted in 15 'nationality languages',
even though its main function was to make people
literate in Amharic. With the introduction of the
PDRE, a formal structure of local government was
created, which entailed an almost complete redrawing
of the regional boundaries which had existed (with
minor modifications) since the early 1940s. These
boundaries were drawn up by a think-tank manned
largely by academics, the Institute for the Study of
Ethiopian Nationalities, which did its work with
considerable sophistication. The areas inhabited by
different peoples were carefully demarcated, and used
(in conjunction with other criteria, such as transport
networks) to create a set of 30 regions which
corresponded as accurately as possible to the mosaic
of Ethiopian nationalities.
These changes had an evident political rationale as
well, in that by offering local peoples their own region,
they could provide a counterweight to the demands of
the various separatist movements. The Afar, a
nomadic people scattered across the Red Sea plain,
were offered an autonomous region drawn from Afar-
inhabited areas of Eritrea, Tigray and Wollo, thus
denying the claims of the EPLF to an Eritrean state
which followed the old Italian colonial boundaries.
The remainder of Eritrea, which was accorded the
status of an autonomous region with special powers,
was subdivided into three subordinate administrative
regions which broadly corresponded to the needs of
ethnic representation, political allegiance, and strategic
control. But the fact that these boundaries were
redrawn late in 1988, in response to requests from a
delegation claiming to represent the Muslim-
dominated ELF, shows how the new regional
structure could be altered at will from the centre. The
Somali-inhabited areas were divided into different
regions corresponding to the Issa clan (which has
maintained a peaceful modus vivendi with the
Ethiopian government), the Isaaq clans (which
generally support the anti-Siyad SNM), and the Darod
clans (which have most strongly supported the
incorporation of the Somali-inhabited areas of
Ethiopia into the Somali Republic). Peripheral
peoples such as the Boran in the south, and the Anuak
and Nuer in the Gambela salient on the Sudanese
border, also gained regions of their own. The whole
exercise indicated a political sensitivity such as the
Ethiopian government has very rarely shown; and if
Ethiopia under any regime is to have a structure of
local government which roughly corresponds to its
ethnic diversity, this demarcation has a good a chance
of providing it as any.
The problems lie in its implementation. Before the
long process of reorganising local government had
even started, it was postponed following the military
disaster at Afabet in March 1988, while the
government concentrated all its resources on
stabilising the position in Eritrea - an apt
commentary on the subordination of long term
planning to desperate crisis management, which
echoed the coincidence between the announcement of
the Ten Year Plan and the famine crisis in September
1984. The names of the WPE first secretaries in the
new regions were announced late in 1988, and
indicated the contrasting priorities of representation
and control. In some regions, such as the Afar
autonomous region and Gambela, the new first
secretaries were local men with previously very junior
status in the party; neither was even an alternate
member of the Central Committee. In regions such as
Eritrea, Tigray and Ogaden, they were drawn from the
senior political cadres of the armed forces, and had
virtually no local standing at all. Elsewhere, there was
a mixture; though several old Derg members
remained, they were mostly assigned to regions with
which they had some connection, while the number of
civilians was increased. Had the new structure been
introduced much earlier in the revolution, and at a
time when there was general acquiescence with the
basic goals of the regime, there would have been at
least a chance that it might have provided an
acceptable balance between the demands of national
unity and the recognition of regional diversity.
Coming so late in the day, from a regime with an
intense commitment to central control, its prospects
are much more uncertain, even outside areas such as
Tigray and Entera where simple lack of government
control prevents its implication.
*
In Ethiopia, as in France, the Soviet Union, and the
People's Republic of China, revolution has served as a
means of centralising state power on the foundation
provided by a decaying monarchy. The Ethiopian
revolution has failed to live up to the example of those
earlier revolutions, not because it has been too
ruthlessly autocratic, but because (in a sense) it has
proved unable to be autocratic enough. Despite an
intense concern for political organisation, and a
massive expansion in the apparatus of state power, it
has been unable to surmount the limitations imposed,
firstly by the extremely fragile and undeveloped
economy on which the state is perched, and secondly
by regional resistance movements which have become
increasingly effective as the weaknesses of the central
state have been exposed.
Much that the revolution has achieved has now been
established beyond any serious possibility of reversal.
Ethiopia has a highly effective structure of rural and
urban government, and an equitable system of
landholding. The educational system has been greatly
expanded, and literacy vastly increased. Many of the
reforms introduced by the central government have
been adopted by the regional opposition movements
in Eritrea and Tigray, which - trying to construct a
similar political apparatus on a similar social base,
and confronting much the same problems of military
survival and decaying peasant agriculture - often
resemble the regime which they oppose.
The regime's most basic failure, however, has been to
see state power as the answer to all its problems. It has
regarded the imposition of a centralised state and
party structure as the solution to the problem of
national unity, almost regardless of regional diversities
which demand, at the very least, substantial
opportunities for local autonomy. It has regarded a
centrally directed economy as the only answer to the
problem of development, almost regardless likewise of
the demonstrable inefficiencies of state direction,
especially in agriculture. The demands of revolutionary
state consolidation have in turn required the
constructions of a greatly expanded state apparatus on
an economic base which is increasingly obviously
unable to support it.
Whereas in much of sub-Saharan Africa, there has
been a real problem of how to create effective political
power, in Ethiopia the problem of power has thus been
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one, not of how to create power, but rather of what can
be done with it. It has been widely assumed in the
Third World (and not just in Ethiopia) that the key to
'development' is the organisaional capacity of the
state. From this viewpoint, the essential task is to force
the state as an effective power tool, characterised by
hierarchy, discipline, honesty and efficiency, which
can then be used in order to create prosperity, welfare,
national unity, or whatever other goals are sought by
the national leadership. This conception of the
instrumental state is particularly intense in
revolutionary situations, since it appeals very strongly
to revolutionary elites, who look to state power as the
means to implement their policies of social and
economic transformation - an attitude encapsulated
in the central role of the 'plan', through which the
goals of the top leadership are (in a phrase constantly
on the lips of the present Ethiopian ruling elite)
'transformed into deeds'. In Ethiopia, this attitude is
reinforced by a long tradition of government from the
top, which has scarcely been affected by a revolution
whose function has been to transform the conditions
of social and economic existence, rather than to
replace a hierarchical by a more participatory form of
government. Government in Ethiopia is a matter for
experts who know what to do; the ignorant peasant, by
contrast, is there to be organised, villagised,
cooperativised, resettled, conscripted, taxed, or, in a
word, governed.
There is no more dramatic symbol of the power of
these mental constructs in shaping the way in which
people live than the villages which have sprung up all
over the Ethiopian countryside since 1985. Their
identical houses laid out in ruler-straight lines, the
placement of compounds, offices, even latrines, is
strictly in accordance with the guidelines issued from
Addis Ababa. tO The 'rationality' of the central plan is
thus made to substitute for the converse rationality of
peasant agriculture, under which homesteads had
previously been scattered according to the dictates of
shelter, drainage or proximity to resources such as
fields and water.
The conjunction in Ethiopia of perhaps the most
powerful indigenous state structure in Africa with
probably its poorest economy, and the persistence of
chronic problems of famine and civil war which
appear to be well beyond the state's capacity to
resolve, thus raise doubts about the appropriateness of
the model of purposive state action as the motor for
development which is shared, it would seem to me, by
government and opposition movements alike. There
are, of course, some goals which this model is well
adapted to achieve, because they require the
hierarchical organisation which it provides. The most
0.1. M. Cohen and N. 1. lsaksson, Villagization in theAr.oRegion of
Ethiopia (Uppsala, 1987) show an aerial photograph of a village,
with the corresponding plan from the government guidelines; I have
noted the same phenomenon while flying over Ethiopia.
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obvious of these is raising an army, and the mass
mobilisation of 1977-78, which (quite as much as
Soviet weapons or Cuban support) defeated the
Somali invasion and contained the EPLF in Eritrea,
remains one of the most dramatic achievements of the
central regime. That the Ethiopian army has not been
more effective in Eritrea must at least in part be due to
the fact that it has been fighting an Eritrean
revolutionary army which is every bit as well
organised as itself, and has the further incentive of
fighting for survival in its own territory. At a more
mundane level, both government and opposition
movements can achieve a high level of effectiveness in
tasks such as literacy campaigns or relief aid
distribution, which likewise depend on hierarchical
organisation.
But there are two very basic problems which do not
respond to management through centralised hierarchy,
and these, uncoincidentally, are the two main failures
of revolutionary Ethiopia. The first is the problem of
meeting the aspirations of groups which cannot simply
be incorporated into a homogenised nationalism,
whether this nationalism be Ethiopian, or indeed
Eritrean. The system is remarkably good at
incorporating, on terms at any rate approaching
equality, anyone who wishes to be fully assimilated
into it. Even the government administration in Eritrea
is very largely manned by indigenous Eritreans. But a
government structure based on hierarchy is corres-
pondingly weak at acknowledging any separate
identity for groups which wish to maintain their own
distinctiveness. Exactly the same problem has
handicapped the resistance movements in Eritrea. The
ELF's initial insistence on a Muslim (or even Arab)
dimension to Eritrean nationalism inherently restricted
its appeal to Christian Eritreans. The EPLF, in
extending its appeal within a Marxist framework to
Eritreans of all ethnic and religious persuasions, has
been reluctant to acknowledge internal ethnic or
religious qualifications to its own conception of a
homogeneous Eritrean nationalism, and has thereby
limited its capacity to gain support from groups, such
as the Kunama and Afar, which have a distinct
identity of their own.
The second is the problem of managing agrarian
transformation, and especially of growing food. A
classic deficiency of Leninist systems of government
throughout the world, this would seem to stem, not so
much from ideological objections to rural class
formation (or kulakisation), as from the needs of
central surplus expropriation. The measures such as
cooperativisation and villagisation, which have been
encouraged by the government ostensibly in order to
promote a more efficient structure of agricultural
production, in practice have as their main effect the
concentration of production into a smaller number of
larger units which are much easier to control than
scattered rural homesteads. There is no evidence at all
that they actually promote more efficient production,
let alone any increase in yields per hectare, and the
available evidence for agricultural producers'
cooperatives runs strongly in the contrary direction.
The main function of cooperatives is, rather, indicated
by the requirement that they sell their entire marketed
output to the Agricultural Marketing Corporation at
state-controlled prices. The role of the state farms in
providing grain for government disposal is even more
evident, as is their absorption of a very high
proportion of the capital available for agricultural
investment. This grain is in turn required to feed the
cities and the army. The political imperatives of
averting urban unrest and maintaining the apparatus
of state control, oblige the government to pay prices to
peasants which provide a strong disincentive to
production. Agricultural production in the parts of
Tigray and Eritrea controlled by the opposition
movements has been disrupted by warfare, and these
areas have normally had to import grain since long
before the revolution; but there is little evidence to
suggest that either the EPLF or the TPLF have
achieved anything approaching the level of
effectiveness in agricultural production that they have
done in military organisation.
The key problem in each case is that the state cannot
achieve its goals because success requires a devolution
of decision-making, either to the local level or to the
market, which challenges the Leninist model of the
all-powerful party-state. In a broader sense, the
intermediary institutions which the Ethiopian govern-
ment has struggled so hard to create are not real
intermediaries between state and people at all. They
are mechanisms through which to express the superior
wisdom of a government which, whether this wisdom
derived from divine right or Marxism-Leninism, has
had no real interest in establishing a dialogue with its
own people.
The question of the level of regional or market
autonomy which is compatible with a Leninist
political structure is currently at issue throughout the
socialist world, most dramatically in the Soviet Union
itself and the Ethiopian government (under strong
external pressure) has recently made some concessions
on both counts, through the regional government
reforms already discussed, and through the adoption
of changes in agricultural marketing urged on it both
by the World Bank, and by the team of Soviet Gosplan
advisers attached to the Ethiopian planning office.
There has, nonetheless, been no real sign of any
willingness on the part of the Ethiopian government to
relinquish the central control which constitutes the
basic rationale for a Leninist political structure. It is
indeed virtually inconceivable that any effective
regional autonomy could be implemented while the
present government headed by Mengistu Haile-
Maryam remains in power; his ruthless suppression of
all opposition has been such that none of the
movements whose acceptance of autonomy is essential
to its success would be likely to accept any role under
his leadership." The most recent attempt to open the
way to negotiation with the separatist movements in
the north, by removing Mengistu, ended in bloody
failure in May 1989. Thus the impasse remains. But the
underlying problem is one, not of personality, but of
the adequacy of the model which Mengistu has come
to embody.
Ah Mazrui once wrote that: The real danger posed by
state socialism in a society with fragile institutions is
not a danger of making the government too strong but
the risk of making it more conspicuously ineffectual')2
The institutions of revolutionary government in
Ethiopia are not fragile, and the government is
conspicuously strong, but much of Mazrui's warning
is still valid. In so starkly demonstrating its own
limitations, it has delivered a severe and possibly
terminal blow to the idea that the creation of a
powerful state and party apparatus on broadly
Leninist lines offers a plausible solution to the crisis of
African development.
At the time of writing. the first publicly acknowledged talks between
the Ethiopian government and the EPLF are taking place; their
outcome remains unclear.
2 Ah Mazrui and M. Tidy, Nationalism and New Slates in Africa
(London. 1984) p.294.
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